But while most international attention has focused on President Obama’s difficulties in getting the backing of American lawmakers, the popular excitement within Iran that greeted the announcement cannot disguise the fact that official reactions there have been decidedly mixed.
The idea that solving the nuclear crisis would unlock a new Iran of economic riches and political moderation has been enthusiastically promoted by the Rouhani administration and its supporters. This is good political spin. But as a reflection of political reality it is seriously flawed – for the simple reason that it conflates a process into a single transformational moment; and perhaps more importantly, it fails to account for the reality of contemporary Iran’s political landscape.
It is a landscape that has been sculpted by the Ahmadinejad years, and in which the pragmatic presidency of his successor Rouhani stands as an island in an ocean of hardline institutions. Hassan Rouhani has done little to change this during his two years in power, in large part because his strategy has been predicated on a successful conclusion of the nuclear issue – gambling that popular support and economic necessity will not only see the agreement through but release some political capital to enact social and political reforms.
He is on firmer ground with the former – and while there continues to be a popular clamour for change, it has been a long time since the politics of the Islamic Republic has been dictated by the will of the people.
Last week supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei decided to set the record straight. This was in sum the pursuit of an arms control agreement, he said – nothing more, nothing less, and certainly not a transformational moment in the politics of the Islamic Republic.
The revolution would continue to oppose the global arrogance of the US and support all its allies in the region – including, pointedly, the oppressed people of Yemen and Bahrain. But Khamenei also stressed that the “text” (he refused to call it an agreement) had to be scrutinised through the proper legal channels, where it might or might not be ratified. This last statement in particular seems to have caught some people by surprise. It was unclear who would be doing the ratifying. Surely the leader’s approval was all that was required?
To be sure, the leader has the final say but before we get there, lots of others get to have their say – including parliament, the Guardian Council, the Revolutionary Guards – and they are not holding back. You can already hear them complaining that the leader has been poorly advised.
One of the curiosities of the Iranian political system is how keenly it seeks to mirror that of the US. Thus if the US Congress has 60 days to review the agreement, the Iranian parliament, not to be outdone, has granted itself 80.
Many of the criticisms being voiced in both nations are also remarkably similar, with diplomats on either side moving quickly to defend the accord. Indeed, if the discussion were limited to diplomats, one suspects the deal would have been sealed. But of course US-Iran relations are far from ordinary: ideological antagonism is embedded within the respective political (if not popular) cultures; distrust is instinctive among the political elites. As one Iranian (rather depressingly) protested to me when I suggested that it would be helpful if “Death to America” were chanted somewhat less: “But ‘Death to America’ is part of our culture.”
The US is a domestic political issue in Iran just as Iran is a domestic political issue in the US, and consequently politics matters. It is not just the domestic political dynamics that need careful watching but the interactions between the protagonists. Diplomats may fudge to get an agreement, politicians tend to brag to secure it, and in this case mutual boasting may unnerve politicians on either side.
It was ill-judged of Obama to tell the New York Times last week: “We could knock out [Iran’s] military in speed and dispatch if we chose to … they have seen my willingness to take military action where I thought it was important for US interests.” Not surprisingly, this provoked a strong response from the Iranian establishment.
Similarly, repeated speculation that the agreement will transform Iran’s politics may provoke an unhelpful reaction from those who have much to lose.
This is not the first opportunity for detente between the US and Iran since 1979. Nor is it the first time that moderation in Iranian politics has had a voice (remember Mohammad Khatami, the reforming president from 1997 to 2005, who the Iranian media are now banned from mentioning). But we must take care not to repeat the mistakes of the past by misreading or indeed ignoring the political realities, the forces of reaction that exist, and the vagaries of politics that may yet trip us up if we move with too much haste.
We should be prudent and manage expectations. We have an opportunity, and must do our best not to squander it.
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